3 This was possible for all but one plan, for which a benchmark was created using its own reported asset class benchmarks, the Cambridge Associates Private Equity Index, and MSCI US REIT Index Returns.
Data on state-level spending, income, and employment are taken from standard sources.
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II. Specifications and Findings
The variation in the investment returns earned by public plans can be decomposed into the variation in asset-class allocations and variation in within asset-class performance.
While asset-class allocations are not distributed randomly, Shoag (2010) shows that for the purposes here, the variation in within-class returns is unrelated to a state's underlying economic shocks. Additionally, I use government spending data from the Census State Government Finances Series, data on state level employment and unemployment from the BLS Current Employment Statistics (CES) and Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAU), and data on personal income from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts. 5 A number of papers explore the amount of in-state bias in public pension plan investments, including Brown, Pollet, and Weisbenner (2009 ), Munnell and Sunden (2001 ), and Hochberg and Rauh (2011 . Calculations in Shoag (2010) show that the magnitude of this bias is sufficiently small relative to the variability of return that, for this application, it does not in practice violate the exclusion restriction. Occasionally, the fiscal year for a pension plan will end after the fiscal year of the administering state. In these cases I attribute the excess funds to following year, so that all excess fund shocks are lagged by at least 12 months and no more than 21 months 
Results
The main results are presented in Table 1 . Column 2 reports the baseline income multiplier: a $1 increase in windfall driven spending increases in-state per capita income by $1.43. This estimate is significant and similar both to the estimates in Shoag (2010) and to the range of estimates produced in the literature described above. Colum 3, which uses data from the BLS-CES, indicates that an additional $100,000 of spending adds an additional 4.5 jobs.
In Table 2 , I use data from the BLS-LAU to explore the source of these additional jobs.
Notes: All regressions include a year fixed effect. The variables are measured in per capita terms, the regressions are weighted by population, and the standard errors are clustered by state. Details on the variables are included in the text.
These data, with spending now measured in $100,000 units, indicate similar overall employment increases. Unlike Shoag (2010) , where the majority of the gains stemmed from increased participation, a significant portion of the increase in this period arises from reductions in unemployment. This is an intriguing finding, and more work is needed to determine what underlies this difference.
III. Conclusion
This study, like much of the literature cited above, finds that local, windfall-financed government spending has large employment and income effects. Despite using entirely new data, the estimates closely match those in Shoag (2010) . While these results should be 
